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CONSEQUENCES OF THE ARAB SPRING: 
HOW SHARI’AH LAW AND THE 
EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION WILL IMPACT 
IP PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 
Stephen S. Zimowski* 
INTRODUCTION 
On February 11, 2011, thousands of Egyptians in Tahrir 
Square celebrated Hosni Mubarak’s departure and, with him, thirty 
years of rule by an oppressive regime.1 While Egyptians celebrated, 
political commentators considered the impact of the Egyptian 
revolution on peace in the Middle East.2 Some feared that an extreme 
sect of Islamic fundamentalists might be behind the revolution and 
                                                 
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Dickinson School of Law, Pennsylvania State 
University. Special thanks to Professor William F. Fox and Professor Flynt Leverett 
for their guidance and recommendations throughout the writing process, and to 
Mark McCormick-Goodhart and the entire Penn State Journal of Law & International 
Affairs editorial staff for their editorial contributions to this comment. 
1 See David D. Kirkpatrick, Egypt Erupts in Jubilation as Mubarak Steps 
Down, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2011, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/12/ 
world/middleeast/12egypt.html?pagewanted=all.  
2 E.g., Douglas Bloomfield, Will Egypt’s Revolution Trample the Peace Process?, 
JERUSALEM POST, http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Article.aspx?id= 
206445 (last updated Feb. 2, 2011); Jennifer Rubin, Egypt’s Revolution Has Nothing to 
Do with Israel, WASH. POST (Feb. 1, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost. 
com/right-turn/2011/02/egypt_has_nothing_to_do_with_i.html; Jack Shenker, 
Egypt Protesters Play Down Islamist Party’s Role, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 31, 2011  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/31/egypt-protesters-islamists-
muslim-brotherhood. 
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pondered the impact of replacing the “Arab world’s first secular 
dictatorship”3 with a traditionalist regime, likening Egypt to Iran 
thirty years before.4 
Egypt’s pivotal role in maintaining stability in the Middle East 
over the last forty years makes its current instability a source of 
trepidation for  and businesspersons.5 This comment addresses these 
concerns relating to intellectual property (IP) rights under Islamic 
law.6 Section II defines the IP protection requirements of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) under the Agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) and examines the 
sources and schools of Islamic jurisprudence.7 Section II also 
considers the harmony between a nation’s obligations under the 
TRIPs agreement and Islamic law.8 Section III expands upon Egypt’s 
role in international business and policy, including its membership in 
the WTO and ratification of the TRIPs agreement.9 In addition, 
Section III compares the implementation of IP protection in Jordan 
and Saudi Arabia, the former a secular Islamic nation and the latter a 
more traditionalist regime.10 Section IV addresses the application of a 
secular or traditionalist approach under Egypt’s new government, and 
how either could affect IP rights.11 
                                                 
3 Kirkpatrick, supra note 1. 
4 See, e.g., Richard Allen Greene, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood: A Force to be 
Feared?, CNN (Jan. 31, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-01-31/world/egypt.mu 
slim.brotherhood_1_egypt-s-muslim-brotherhood-ayman-nour-protests?_s=PM:W 
ORLD; Michael Slackman, Islamist Group is Rising Force in a New Egypt, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 24, 2011, at A1. 
5 See The Global Fallout from the Middle East Crisis, BUS. STANDARD (Mar. 
14, 2011, 6:44 AM), http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/the-global-
fallout-frommiddle-east-crisis/428442/. 
6 The author uses Islamic Law in the sense of governmental application 
of the principles of the Shari’ah as applied to the nation’s system of justice. Islamic 
law and Shari’ah law are used interchangeably throughout this comment. 
7 See discussion infra Parts II.A-B. 
8 See discussion infra Part II.C. 
9 See discussion infra Part III.C. 
10 See discussion infra Parts III.A-B. 
11 See discussion infra Part IV. 
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This comment concludes that IP rights find substantial 
protection in Islamic nations.12 Many Islamic law nations have 
implemented IP protection laws and have become members of the 
WTO.13 Commentators concerned about the future of IP rights in 
Egypt can remain confident that changes in Egypt’s governmental 
structure will not substantially affect its IP protection scheme.14 
II. IP, TRIPS, AND ISLAMIC LAW 
To competently discuss IP rights under Islamic law, one must 
understand the nature of Islamic jurisprudence and the role of IP 
rights in international trade. This section explores the requirements 
imposed upon WTO member nations under the TRIPs agreement, 
the sources and schools of Islamic law, and the interaction of Islamic 
jurisprudence and IP protection. This section concludes with a 
discussion of the Islamic law of contracts and the role international 
treaties play in Islamic lawmaking. 
A. TRIPs 
In 1986, in an extended negotiation known as the Uruguay 
Round, members of the international community considered creating 
a global trade organization.15 The goal was to stabilize international 
trade by improving the established guidelines of the 1947 General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947).16 The Uruguay 
Round’s conclusion in 1994 established the WTO along with several 
binding agreements for WTO member nations.17 The TRIPs 
                                                 
12 See infra Part V. 
13 See Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://wto. 
org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/ tif_e/org6_e.htm (last updated Jul. 23, 2008). 
14 See discussion infra Part IV. 
15 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO 
Agreement], http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf. 
16 Id.  
17 Id. 
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agreement defines the minimal IP protection required of WTO 
members.18 
The TRIPs agreement is split into seven parts.19 Part I 
provides the basic principles of the agreement, requiring a nation to 
provide non-nationals with IP protection equal to that afforded 
nationals.20 Part II provides specific protection requirements for 
copyrights, patents, trademarks, and trade secrets, among others.21  
Part III requires a signatory nation to implement domestic laws for 
the enforcement of IP right and remedies for IP infringement.22 Parts 
IV through VII discuss IP related procedures, dispute resolution, and 
other signatory arrangements.23 
Specifically, the TRIPs agreement requires that copyright 
protection be extended to literary and artistic works in all forms, 
including books, pamphlets, lectures, musical compilations, 
choreographic works, drawings, paintings, sculptures, architecture, 
and maps.24 The agreement also adds computer programs to the list 
of protected copyright media and requires that the author be afforded 
protection for at least fifty years.25 In addition, the TRIPs agreement 
requires that patent protection be available for products or processes 
that “are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial 
application.”26 However, the agreement permits a nation to exclude 
protection for certain medical methods and other inventions 
                                                 
18 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs 
Agreement], http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm. 
19 See id. 
20 Id. arts. 1-8. 
21 Id. arts. 9-40. 
22 Id. arts. 41-61. 
23 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 18, arts. 62-73. 
24 See id. art. 9. Article nine implements the requirements of the Berne 
Convention, which protects the listed media. Berne Convention for the Protection 
of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised at Paris on July 24, 
1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 30 [hereinafter Berne Convention],  http://www.wipo.int/ 
treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs_wo001.html. 
25 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 18, arts. 10, 12. 
26 Id. art. 27. 
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“necessary to protect ordre public or morality.”27 Inventors must be 
afforded at least twenty years of patent protection under the TRIPs 
agreement.28 
The TRIPs agreement also requires trademark protection be 
provided for signs and symbols “capable of distinguishing [] goods 
and services.”29 Third parties may not use an identical or similar mark 
for identical or similar business activities if such use would cause a 
“likelihood of confusion” for consumers.30 Adhering nations must 
create a system for trademark registration, and registration must be 
indefinitely renewable for terms of at least seven years.31 Finally, the 
TRIPs agreement requires protection of trade secrets, defined as 
information (1) that is “not . . . generally known among or readily 
accessible to” competitors, (2) that “has commercial value because it 
is secret,” and (3) for which the holder of the information has taken 
steps to keep it secret.32 
Some commentators criticize the TRIPs agreement for its 
adverse effect on developing countries.33 Others34 assert that IP 
protection in developing nations increases innovative activities and 
foreign investment, thereby benefiting developing economies.35 What 
                                                 
27 Id. 
28 Id. art. 33. 
29 Id. art. 15. 
30 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 18, art. 16. 
31 Id. arts. 15, 18. 
32 Id. art. 39. 
33 E.g., Sean Pager, TRIPS: A Link Too Far? A Proposal for Procedural 
Restraints on Regulatory Linkage in the WTO, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 215, 
221-22 (2006) (asserting that the WTO has over-exercised its authority by enacting 
affirmative regulations on member nations); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 
10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369, 370-71 (2006) (arguing that the TRIPs 
agreement needs reform to advance the agenda of developing nations). 
34 Supporters of the TRIPs agreement are, for the most part, pundits of 
developed nations that benefit from the international enforcement of IP rights. 
35 See Danielle Tully, Prospects for Progress: The TRIPS Agreement and 
Developing Countries After the DOHA Conference, 26 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 129, 
137 (2003). 
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is clear is that any nation wishing to benefit from membership in the 
WTO must enact IP laws in accordance with the TRIPs agreement.36 
B. Islamic Jurisprudence 
This section explores the primary and secondary sources of 
Islamic law and the four schools of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence: 
Hanafi, Shafii, Maliki, and Hanbali.37 The sources of Islamic law and 
the schools of jurisprudence require concurrent discussion because 
each school uses different terminology to reflect similar principles.38 
Accordingly, discussion of a source is difficult without also 
referencing the related school. 
1. Sources of Islamic Law 
The Qur’an and the Sunnah (and Hadith) are the primary 
sources of Islamic law.39 The Qur’an is the word of Allah as spoken 
to the prophet Muhammad.40 Because the Qur’an is the highest 
source of law under Shari’ah, no other source may contradict its 
principles.41 The Sunnah is a recording of the manner and practice of 
the Prophet Muhammad’s life and provides a guide for Muslim 
behavior.42 Similarly, Hadith refers to the recorded sayings and 
opinions that the Prophet Muhammad verbalized during his life as 
well as his approval or disapproval of activities he witnessed.43  
                                                 
36 See WTO Agreement, supra note 15; TRIPs Agreement, supra note 18. 
37 M. Charif Bassiouni & Gamal M. Badr, The Shari’ah: Sources, 
Interpretation, and Rule-Making, 1 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 135, 142 n.18 
(2002). 
38 See Irshad Abdal-Haqq, Islamic Law: An Overview of its Origin and 
Elements, 7 J. ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 27, 57 (2002) (noting the different Arabic 
terms meaning interpretation in the public interest).  
39 Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 37, at 139. 
40 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 45. 
41 Silvia Beltrametti, The Legality of Intellectual Property Rights under Islamic 
Law, in THE PRAGUE YEARBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 2009 55, 59 (Mach, T. et 
al. eds., 2010), http://www.digitalislam.eu/article.do?articleId=2729. 
42 Id. at 60. 
43 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 46-47. 
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Islamic scholars use the Sunnah and Hadith in combination to 
provide the second primary source of Shari’ah law.44 
Where the principles of the Qur’an and Sunnah do not 
adequately adjudicate a legal issue, Islamic scholars and jurists use 
Fiqh45 —the process of deducing and applying Shari’ah principles—
to reach a legal determination.46 The methodologies of Fiqh are 
numerous, and it is in the application of Fiqh that the several schools 
of Shari’ah diverge.47 However, all four schools recognize the 
fundamental methodologies of Ijma and Qiyas: reasoning by 
consensus and analogy, respectively.48 
Ijma is a consensus regarding the interpretation or application 
of Shari’ah.49 Where Islamic scholars or members of the community 
reach a consensus regarding a legal issue, their interpretation receives 
deference for future generations.50 This legal principle is not 
dissimilar to stare decisis51 under American common law.  All schools 
of Shari’ah recognize the consensus of the Sahaba (followers of the 
Prophet Muhammad); however, not all schools recognize the 
consensus of scholars from later eras.52 
Qiyas is reasoning by analogy.53 Each individual necessarily 
reasons by analogy in reaching a consensus.54 Because Ijma represents 
                                                 
44 Id. at 47. 
45 This term can also be used in reference to the collective body of laws 
arising from Fiqh. Id. at 36. However, for the purposes of this comment, Fiqh is 
used in reference to the method of reasoning. 
46 Id. at 36. 
47 See id. at 54-58; Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 37, at 140-41. 
48 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 73. 
49 Id. at 54-55. 
50 Id. 
51 Latin in origin, stare decisis means “to stand by things decided.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1537 (9th ed. 2009). The legal doctrine in American 
common law requires judges to follow the precedent set by previous courts. Id. 
Stare decisis helps to ensure that society can rely on court decisions to guide future 
behavior, an important aspect of a common law legal system. See id. 
52 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 55-56. 
53 Id. at 56. 
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the consensus of several individuals reasoning by analogy, Islamic 
scholars grant Ijma greater authority in the hierarchy of Fiqh 
methodology.55 The schools of jurisprudence differ in the level of 
authority provided by Qiyas as well as their willingness to engage in 
the methodology.56 
Although there are numerous other Fiqh methodologies,57 
this comment additionally considers only Istislah. The term used to 
represent this methodology varies by school,58 but the principle 
invoked is interpretation in the public interest.59 Like public policy 
considerations in American common law, Islamic jurists use Istislah 
to establish legal doctrines and reach legal determinations where the 
other methodologies fall short.60 
2. Schools of Islamic Law 
The four Sunni61 schools of Islamic jurisprudence—each 
named after the founding scholar of its methodological principles62 
—are Hanbali, Shafii, Maliki, and Hanafi.63 Each school differs in its 
application of Fiqh, either by recognizing different doctrines, by 
                                                 
54 All secondary sources provide legal principles in the absence of 
primary source authority. In reaching a consensus, therefore, each individual uses 
an analogy to a primary source principle and agrees on the legal result. See id. at 56. 
55 Id. 
56 For example, Hanbali scholars employ Qiyas only as a last resort. Id. at 
73. 
57 For a discussion of additional Fiqh methods such as Istihab—
presumption of continuity, Urf—local custom, and Ijtihad—individual reasoning, 
see Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 58-59. 
58 Istislah is known as Istihsan in the Hanafi School and Masalih Al-
Mursalah in the Maliki School.  Id. at 57. 
59 Id. 
60 Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 38, at 158-59. 
61 The Jafari School is an additional Shiite school of jurisprudence.  
Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 74. Because the nations discussed herein are 
predominantly Sunni, this comment does not discuss the Shiite school. 
62 Id. at 67-68. 
63 Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 37, at 142 n.18. 
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giving greater or lesser authority to them, or by applying them 
differently.64 
Hanbali is the school from which Saudi scholars base their 
system of methodology and reasoning.65 The Hanbali School uses a 
more literal interpretation of the primary sources.66 Additionally, 
Hanbali scholars recognize Ijma (consensus) only of the Sahaba67 and 
refuse to apply Ijma to subsequent eras because of the divergence of 
thought.68 Finally, Hanbali scholars seldom undertake Istislah and 
resort to Qiyas only as a last resort.69 
The Shafii School is the predominant school in Egypt and 
throughout the western regions of the Middle East.70 Shafii, the 
school’s founder, is credited with the initial “systemiz[ation] of the 
fundamental principles of Fiqh.”71 Shafii scholars entirely reject 
Istislah and undertake Qiyas only to the extent a legitimate analogy 
can be drawn.72 Shafii scholars accept Ijma of the Sahaba as well as 
other eras, separating themselves from Hanbali scholars.73 
Many commentators regard the Maliki School as the most 
moderate of the four schools because it permits methods of 
interpretation beyond those of the other three.74 In interpreting 
Shari’ah, Maliki scholars place special emphasis on the historical 
custom and practices of the Medina75 people who lived among the 
Prophet Muhammad during the final ten years of his life.76 In fact, 
                                                 
64 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 70-75. 
65 Id. at 72. 
66 Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 63. 
67 The Sahaba were the followers of the Prophet Muhammad. Abdal-
Haqq, supra note 38, at 55. 
68 Id. at 73. 
69 Id. at 72-73. 
70 Id. at 71. 
71 Id. 
72 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 72. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 71. 
75 Medina is a city in what is now Saudi Arabia. It is the center of the 
Maliki School and was the home of the Prophet Muhammad for the final ten years 
of his life.  Id. at 70-71. 
76 Id. 
 2013 Comment 2:1 
159 
Maliki scholars place those customs above Ijma, Qiyas, and Istislah 
on the Fiqh hierarchy.77 The Maliki School is found predominantly 
throughout northern and western Africa, including parts of northern 
Egypt.78 
Hanafi is the final Sunni school of Islamic jurisprudence. It is 
prevalent throughout the central region of the Middle East, including 
Jordan and some parts of Egypt.79 Like Maliki scholars, Hanafi 
scholars interpret Shari’ah based on local customs and practices.80  
However, unlike Maliki scholars, Hanafi scholars consider custom 
only after interpretation through Ijma, Qiyas and Istislah fails to 
provide a suitable resolution.81 The Hanafi School tends to be more 
moderate in its interpretation and application of Shari’ah.82 
Because each of the four schools of Islamic jurisprudence 
interprets Shari’ah differently, laws in Islamic nations can vary 
substantially.83 To appreciate these differences, it is helpful to 
understand the Islamic schools of jurisprudence and their varying 
applications of the Fiqh methodologies. 
C. Islamic Law’s Effect on IP Protection 
After the discussion of Islamic jurisprudence above, this 
Section briefly explores the effect of Shari’ah on IP laws and the 
                                                 
77 Abdal-Haqq, supra note38, at 71. 
78 Id. at 70-71; Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 62. 
79 Id. at 69; Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 62. 
80 Id. at 70. 
81 Id. 
82 See Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 63. 
83 For example, family law and criminal law issues are often dependent 
on the interpretation of Shari’ah employed in a region, as are human rights 
considerations. Compare Ferris K. Nesheiwat, Honor Crimes in Jordan: Their Treatment 
Under Islamic and Jordanian Criminal Law, 23 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 251 (2004) 
(discussing certain Jordan laws relating to human rights), with Frank E. Vogel, The 
Trial of Terrorists Under Classical Islamic Law, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53 (2002) 
(comparing differences in treatment of criminals in various Islamic nations); see also 
Katherine M. Weaver, Women’s Rights and Shari’a Law: A Workable Reality? An 
Examination of Possible International Human Rights Approaches Through The Continuing 
Reform of the Pakistani Hudood Ordinance, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 483 (2007) 
(discussing the plight of woman under the law in some Islamic nations). 
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requirements under the TRIPs agreement. Because the primary 
sources of Shari’ah do not explicitly support IP rights, an Islamic 
lawmaker must rely on Fiqh methodologies to justify IP protection.84 
There is substantial support for protecting personal property rights 
under Shari’ah; protecting IP rights follows naturally by analogy. 
Personal property rights derive from both the Sunnah85 and the 
Qur’an: “And among His Signs Is . . . the quest that ye (Make for 
livelihood),”86 recognizing the acquisition of property through 
personal undertakings.87 Whether through research, composition, 
ingenuity or some combination thereof, IP, like personal property, 
derives from the efforts of the discoverer. The same justifications for 
tangible personal property rights therefore extend to intangible IP 
rights.88 
Neither of the primary sources (the Qur’an and the Sunnah) 
limits its discussion of property to tangible property.89 This fact is 
important because scholars employ Fiqh reasoning only for 
clarification when the primary sources are silent or ambiguous.90 
Some scholars interpret the silence of the primary sources on this 
issue to be a rejection of intangible property rights.91 However, this 
interpretation conflicts with the generally accepted practice of 
                                                 
84 See generally Steven D. Jamar, The Protection of Intellectual Property Under 
Islamic Law, 21 CAP. U. L. REV. 1079 (1992) (asserting that Shari’ah is silent on IP 
rights); Beltrametti, supra note 41 (arguing that Shari’ah supports IP rights, however 
does so through principles of Fiqh interpretation outside the primary sources). 
85 Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 65 (quoting Translation of Sahih Muslim, 
Book 7, The Book of Pilgrimage (Kitab Al-Hajj) ch. 17, No.2803) (asserting that 
recognition of personal property can be found in the recorded words of 
Muhammad: “[Y]our property are as sacred and inviolable as the sacredness of this 
day of yours.”). 
86 Qur’an, 30:23. 
87 See Jamar, supra note 84, at 1083 (“The act of making unproductive 
land productive, of using something unused, creates ownership.”). 
88 See id. at 1086 (arguing that, at worst, Islamic jurisprudence is silent on 
protecting IP, and IP rights may be specifically supported through the 
methodologies of Shari’ah interpretation); see generally Beltrametti, supra note 41 
(exploring the relationship between IP law and Shari’ah). 
89 See Qur’an, 30:23; Jamar, supra note 84, at 1083; Beltrametti, supra note 
41, at 65-66. 
90 Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 37, at 140. 
91 See Jamar, supra note 84, at 1085. 
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applying Fiqh to “fill in the gaps” left by the primary sources.92  
Drawing an analogy between tangible and intangible property is 
consistent with accepted methods of Shari’ah interpretation.93 
Certain schools of Islamic jurisprudence are more likely to 
draw such an analogy.94 Scholars of the Hanbali and Shafii Schools 
disfavor Qiyas (reasoning by analogy) and instead prefer a literal 
translation of the primary sources.95 By contrast, scholars of the 
Maliki and Hanafi Schools apply Qiyas more liberally and are likely to 
accept IP as analogous to personal property.96 Support for IP laws 
may therefore depend on the prevailing practice of the region, at least 
insofar as support depends upon interpretation through Qiyas. 
Istislah (public interest) further supports protecting IP rights.  
There are significant benefits, both economic and societal, in 
providing IP protection.97 Recognizing IP rights allows innovators to 
profit from their ingenuity.98 The financial benefits encourage further 
innovation and technological advances,99 in turn improving quality of 
life.100 
                                                 
92 Id. at 1082. 
93 Note that there is some support in historical Islamic jurisprudence for 
recognizing intangible property. Id. at 1085 (“[O]ne does not amputate the hand of 
a thief for stealing a book because the thief’s intention is not to steal the book as 
paper, but the ideas in the book . . . .  [T]his particular rule is not Quranic, does not 
come from the traditions, is not based on consensus, and is not from the qiyas type 
of reasoning.  That is, this rule comes from a commentary on the law written by a 
prominent jurist.”).  
94 See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
95 See Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 69-74. 
96 See id. 
97 See generally Intellectual Capital and Intellectual Property, KLM, INC. MGMT. 
CONSULTATION (Jul. 1, 2011), http://klminc.com/intellectual-capital/intellectual-
capital-and-intellectual-property (discussing the assessment of the value of a 
business’s intellectual property). 
98 See id. (“On average, in successful organizations Brands, Intellectual 
Property, and other Intangible Assets are two to three times the value of physical 
assets.”). 
99 Why Intellectual Property Matters, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www. 
state.gov/e/eb/tpp/ipe/why/index.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
100 Id. 
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Some scholars argue that IP protection harms the public 
interest. “If public interest is drawn too broadly and too powerfully, 
it can be [used] to remove protections for IP on the grounds that the 
whole society has need of or could benefit by unrestricted use of the 
item.”101 Pharmaceutical patents present the most obvious support 
for this proposition. 
The owner of a pharmaceutical patent has a monopoly over 
the medication’s production.102 With complete control over 
production, the patent owner can manipulate both the price and 
supply of the medication.  Such manipulation can result in high prices 
and limited supply, which together harm public health.103 
Accordingly, developing countries often advocate against 
pharmaceutical patent protection.104 In response, many developed 
countries have argued that pharmaceutical patents incentivize drug 
development, improving health care overall.105 
Furthering the pharmaceutical patent debate’s importance is 
the WTO’s requirement under the TRIPs agreement that member 
nations enact laws protecting pharmaceutical patents.106 If Islamic law 
                                                 
101 Jamar, supra note 84, at 1090-91. 
102 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 18, art. 28 (“A patent shall confer on its 
owner the following exclusive rights . . . to prevent third parties not having the 
owner’s consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, [or] selling . . . 
[the patented] product.”). 
103 For example, the petitioning of Pfizer Inc. to reduce the price of its 
AIDS treatment drug Diflucan for use in high-risk, poor countries has resulted in 
about forty-seven percent of those infected receiving treatment. See Kate Kelland, 
HIV Numbers Hit New High as AIDS Drugs Save Lives, REUTERS (Nov. 21, 2011, 
6:21 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/21/us-aids-global-unaids-idU 
STRE7AK0KX20111121. 
104 See Jonathan Lynn, Developing Countries Form Intellectual Property Group, 
REUTERS (Apr. 26, 2010, 10:11 AM), http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/04/26/id 
INIndia-48011820100426 (reporting the dissatisfaction of developing countries 
with many IP schemes because they “deprive poor people of access to essential 
medicines”). 
105 See id. (noting the assertion by developed countries that “strong [IP] 
rights are needed to encourage invention”). 
106 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 18, art. 70 (requiring laws enacting 
“patent protection for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products 
commensurate with [the member nation’s] obligations under Article 27”); but cf. 
TRIPs Agreement, supra note 18, art. 27 (“Members may exclude from patentability 
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prohibits pharmaceutical patent protection, Islamic nations would be 
ineligible for WTO membership.107 Due to these concerns, WTO 
members are currently engaged in negotiations concerning 
pharmaceutical patent protection requirements under the TRIPs 
agreement.108 To date, the WTO has not reached a resolution.109 
Indeed, the implications of this debate on Islamic nations 
could be severe. If lawmakers employing Istislah believe 
pharmaceutical patent protection harms the public interest, they may 
refuse to accept the TRIPs agreement110 and reject WTO 
membership.111 This result is surprising given the reputation of 
moderation enjoyed by Shari’ah scholars willing to engage in Istislah 
in comparison to their unwilling counterparts.112 
Scholars of the Shafii and Hanbali Schools rarely engage in 
Istislah;113 in fact, Shafii Scholars outright reject the methodology.114  
In part because of their reluctance to employ Istislah, many 
commentators believe the Shafii and Hanbali Schools to be more 
traditionalist than the Maliki and Hanafi Schools.115 However, 
lawmakers guided by the Shafii and Hanbali Schools who disfavor 
                                                 
inventions, the prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of 
which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment, 
provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is 
prohibited by their law.”).  
107 If a nation refuses to implement IP protection, they cannot adopt the 
TRIPs agreement and are therefore ineligible for WTO membership. See supra Part 
II.A. 
108 The Doha Round, or Doha Development Agenda, is designed to 
address the concerns of developing WTO members.  See The Doha Round, WORLD 
TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm#develop 
ment (last visited Mar. 22, 2013). 
109 See Paige McClanahan, Doha Round Trade Talks – Explainer, GUARDIAN 
(Sept. 3, 2012, 5:17 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2012/ 
sep/03/doha-round-trade-talks-explainer. 
110 See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 18, art. 70 (requiring a WTO 
member nation to protect pharmaceutical patents). 
111 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
112 See Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 71; Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 63. 
113 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 72-73. 
114 Id. 
115 See id. at 71; Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 63. 
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interpreting Shari’ah in the public interest will not encounter the 
pharmaceutical patent debate and will therefore have no compelling 
argument for rejecting IP rights. 
Overall, Fiqh methodology tends to support recognizing IP 
rights. Nevertheless, Shari’ah law does not compel such 
recognition.116 Islamic lawmakers might therefore reject the 
arguments supporting IP rights, leaving them to determine the 
wisdom of undertaking IP protection statutorily and without 
significant guidance from Shari’ah. 
D. Contracting to Protect IP Rights 
Many considerations will influence the decisions of Islamic 
lawmakers. These influences include international trade, where 
treaties with foreign nations can significantly benefit an Islamic 
nation’s economy.117 International treaties represent binding 
contractual agreements between two or more nations.118 
Islamic law commands individuals to uphold their obligations 
under contractual agreements.119 Likewise, Islamic nations must fulfill 
their contractual agreements.120 In fact, the Qur’an explicitly compels 
practitioners to honor both contractual agreements121 and treaties.122 
Therefore, if an Islamic nation enters an international agreement to 
                                                 
116 See generally Jamar, supra note 84 (asserting that Shari’ah is silent on IP 
law); Beltrametti, supra note 41 (arguing that Shari’ah supports IP law, however 
does so through principles of interpretation outside the primary sources). 
117 See, e.g., Jordan: GDP (Purchase Power Parity), INDEX MUNDI, http:// 
www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=jo&v=65 (last visited Oct. 30, 2012) (stating 
that Jordan’s GDP has more than doubled since 1999, which is the same period 
Jordan began reforms in IP law, joined the WTO, and entered the US-Jordan 
FTA). 
118 Frederick L. Kirgis, Treaties as Binding International Obligation, AM. SOC’Y 
OF INT’L LAW (May 1997), http://www.asil.org/insight9.cfm. 
119 Qur’an 5:1. 
120 Jamar, supra note 84, at 1087. 
121 Qur’an 5:1 (“O ye who believe!  Fulfill (all) obligations.”). 
122 Qur’an 9:4 (“(But the treaties are) not dissolved with those Pagans 
with whom ye have entered into alliance and who have not subsequently failed you 
in aught, nor aided any one against you.  So fulfill your engagements with them to 
the end of their term: for Allah loveth the righteous.”). 
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protect IP rights, it is obligated to enact laws in accordance with that 
treaty’s provisions. 
Shari’ah interpretation undoubtedly plays a significant role in 
the legal decisions of any Islamic nation. Lawmakers may differ with 
respect to Fiqh methodologies and may debate whether Shari’ah 
supports IP protection.123 However, there is little, if any, support for 
prohibiting IP protection.124 If an Islamic nation contracts to protect 
IP rights through an international treaty or some other agreement, it 
must fulfill its contractual obligations.125 
III. IP UNDER ISLAMIC LAW: JORDAN, SAUDI ARABIA, AND PRE-
REVOLUTION EGYPT 
Shari’ah interpretation varies considerably among Islamic 
jurists.126 Consequently, Islamic lawmaking can be unpredictable.  
This section considers the effects of two separate implementations of 
Shari’ah: the secular approach, taken in the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan (Jordan), and the traditionalist approach, taken in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Saudi Arabia). Additionally, this section 
reviews IP law in Egypt under the Mubarak regime and sets the stage 
for a discussion on the future of IP protection in Egypt. 
A. IP Protection in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
By enacting new laws and regulations, Jordan has substantially 
expanded its IP protection over the past fifteen years.127 As a result, 
IP rights now find significant protection in the Hashemite kingdom. 
                                                 
123 See discussion supra Parts II.B-C. 
124 See generally Beltrametti, supra note 41; Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38; 
Jamar, supra note 84. 
125 See infra Part III.C. 
126 See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
127 E.g., Law No. 9 of 2006 (Trade Names), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 2 Feb. 
2006 (Jordan); Law No. 9 of 2005 (Amending the Copyright Protection Law), Al-
Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 21 Feb. 2005 (Jordan); Law No. 28 of 2007 (Amending the 
Patents Law), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 31 Mar. 2007 (Jordan). Each of these laws can 
be found at  http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp?code=JO. 
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Jordan’s legal system combines Islamic law with a civil code 
adopted from and similar to many European countries.128 The 
Jordanian Constitution of 1953 establishes “an independent 
sovereign Arab State” and a “parliamentary [system] with a hereditary 
monarchy.”129 Although the Constitution adopts Islam as the state 
religion,130 Article 14 provides for freedom of religion.131 However, 
this provision is limited to the “exercise of all forms of worship and 
religious rites in accordance with the customs observed in the 
Kingdom, unless such exercise is inconsistent with public order or 
morality.”132 Despite the constitutional declaration of religious 
tolerance, Jordan prohibits conversion from Islam and provides that 
the king must be a member of the Islamic faith.133 In effect, Islam 
remains a substantial influence on Jordan’s legal system. 
Given Islam’s influence, Jordan’s interpretation of Shari’ah is 
critical to its implementation of IP protection. As discussed 
previously, Jordanian lawmakers predominantly follow the Hanafi 
School of Shari’ah interpretation.134 Hanafi scholars’ emphasis on 
Qiyas (analogy) and Istislah (public interest) provide significant 
support for IP rights.135 An array of recently enacted Jordanian laws 
reflects this support. These laws protect patents,136 copyrights,137 
                                                 
128 See Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 69. 
129 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN Jan. 
8, 1952, art. 1, [hereinafter CONSTITUTION OF JORDAN], http://www.wipo.int/ 
wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=9789. 
130 Id. art. 2. 
131 Id. art. 14. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. art. 28(e) (“No person shall ascend the Throne unless he is a 
Moslem . . .”); see also BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE, JULY-DECEMBER, 2010 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
REPORT (Jordan) (Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010_5/ 
168267.htm (“[T]he government’s application of Sharia infringes upon the religious 
rights and freedoms laid out in the constitution by prohibiting conversion from 
Islam and discriminating against religious minorities in some matters.”).  
134 See supra Part II.B.2. 
135 See supra Part II.C. 
136 Law No. 32 of 1999 (Patents), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 20 Sept. 1999 
(Jordan); Law No. 28 of 2007 (Amending the Patents Law), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 31 
Mar. 2007 (Jordan). Each of these laws can be found at http://www.wipo.int/ 
wipolex/en/profile.jsp?code=JO. 
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trademarks,138 trade names,139 trade secrets,140 plant varieties,141 
integrated circuits,142 and industrial designs.143 
Not surprisingly, Jordan’s IP law reformation coincides with 
its entry into the WTO and its adoption of the TRIPs agreement.144 
Notably, the current patent statute protects pharmaceutical patents 
after its amendment in 2001.145 In addition to WTO membership, 
                                                 
137 Law No. 22 of 1992 (Protection of Copyright and its Amendments) 
Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 19 Mar. 1992 (Jordan); Law No. 88 of 2003 (Amending the 
Copyright Protection Law), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 30 Sept. 2003 (Jordan); Law No. 8 
of 2005 (Amending the Copyright Protection Law), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 21 Feb. 
2005 (Jordan); Law No. 9 of 2005 (Amending the Copyright Protection Law), Al-
Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 21 Feb. 2005 (Jordan). Each of these laws can be found at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp?code=JO. 
138 Law No. 33 of 1952 (Trademarks), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 20 May 1952 
(Jordan); Law No. 19 of 1953 (Marks of Goods with its Amendments), Al-Jarida 
Al-Rasmiya, 16 Feb. 1953 (Jordan); Law No. 34 of 1999 (Amending the Trademarks 
Law), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 22 Sept. 1999 (Jordan); Law No. 29 of 2007 (Amending 
the Trademarks Law), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 31 Mar. 2007 (Jordan); Law No. 15 of 
2008 (Amending the Trademarks Law), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 11 Mar. 2008 
(Jordan). Each of these laws can be found at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/ 
profile.jsp?code=JO. 
139 Law No. 9 of 2006 (Trade Names), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 2 Feb. 2006 
(Jordan), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp?code=JO. 
140 Law No. 15 of 2000 (Unfair Competition and Trade Secrets), Al-Jarida 
Al-Rasmiya, 2 May 2000 (Jordan), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp? 
code=JO. 
141 Law No. 24 of 2000 (Protection of New Varieties of Plants), Al-Jarida 
Al-Rasmiya, 11 June 2000 (Jordan), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp? 
code=JO. 
142 Law No. 10 of 2000 (Protection of Layout-Designs of Integrated 
Circuits), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 14 Feb 2000 (Jordan), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex 
/en/profile.jsp?code=JO. 
143 Law No. 14 of 2000 (Industrial Designs and Models), Al-Jarida Al-
Rasmiya, 24 Feb. 2000 (Jordan), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp? 
code=JO. 
144 Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last updated Jul. 23, 2008). 
145 Temporary Law No. 71 of 2001 (Amending Patents Law), Al-Jarida 
Al-Rasmiya, 9 Oct. 2001 (Jordan), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp? 
code=JO. 
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Jordan signed a bilateral Free Trade Agreement with the United 
States146 (US-Jordan FTA) in 2000.147 
Jordan’s recent ingress into the international trade arena 
coincides with the rise of King Abdullah II (Abdullah) in 1999.148 
Jordan’s GDP has more than doubled from sixteen billion in 1999 to 
an estimated thirty-four billion in 2010, reflecting economic progress 
as a result of the Abdullah administration’s secular approach to 
international politics and trade.149 Assuming the Abdullah 
administration retains power, Jordan’s secular approach to IP 
protection will likely continue.150 
Jordan’s recently enacted legislation reflects lawmakers’ belief 
that Islamic law supports IP rights.151 Further demonstrating this 
belief, Jordanian lawmakers have adopted a number of IP-related 
international treaties,152 including the WIPO Copyright Treaty,153 the 
Berne Convention,154 and the Paris Convention.155 
                                                 
146 Agreement Between the United States of America and the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, Oct. 
4, 2000, 41 I.L.M 63 [hereinafter USJ FTA], http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agree 
ments/All_Trade_Agreements/exp_005607.asp. 
147 Mohammad El Said, Jordan, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
LAWS, 4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, Jordan-1, Jordan-24 (Roger Blanpain & 
Hendrick Vanhees eds., 2005). 
148 Id. at 23. 
149 Jordan: GDP (Purchase Power Parity), INDEX MUNDI, http://www.index 
mundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=jo&v=65 (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
150 See generally Ranya Kadri & Ethan Bronner, Government of Jordan is 
Dismissed by the King, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 18, 2011, at A8, http://www.nytimes.com/20 
11/10/18/world/middleeast/king-abdullah-ii-of-jordan-fires-his-government.html 
(facing political pressure and accusations of slowing political change, King 
Abdullah II fired his prime minister and members of his administration). 
151 E.g., Law No. 28 of 2007 (Amending the Patents Law), Al-Jarida Al-
Rasmiya, 31 Mar. 2007 (Jordan); Law No. 9 of 2005 (Amending the Copyright 
Protection Law), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 21 Feb. 2005 (Jordan); Law No. 15 of 2008 
(Amending the Trademarks Law), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya, 11 Mar. 2008 (Jordan). 
Each of these laws can be found at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp? 
code=JO. 
152 See Jordan: IP Laws and Treaties, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http:// 
www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp?code=JO (last updated Aug. 15, 2011). 
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The Jordanian government also endorsed IP rights by 
undertaking the US-Jordan FTA.156 Article 4.3 of the US-Jordan FTA 
requires that each state must provide IP protection “no less 
favorable” than the protection provided to “its own nationals.”157 In 
addition, Articles 4.24 and 4.25 encourage the enforcement of IP 
rights against infringers from either country by awarding monetary 
damages “sufficiently high to deter future acts of infringement.”158 
Finally, contemporaneous to the US-Jordan FTA, both the 
U.S. government and the Jordanian government signed an important 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).159 The MOU begins by stating: 
The Government of the United States of America . . . and the 
Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan . . . recognizing the 
need to promote adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights, to 
provide enhanced intellectual property protection to account for the 
latest technological developments, and to promote greater efficiency 
and transparency in the administration of intellectual property 
systems in order to strengthen the international trading system; 
Agree . . .160 
This language unequivocally reflects Jordan’s recognition of 
IP rights. Because the Qur’an commands adherence to treaties and 
                                                 
153 WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997), http:// 
www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/pdf/trtdocs_wo033.pdf. 
154 Berne Convention, supra note 24. 
155 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, as last 
revised at the Stockholm Revision Conference, Jul. 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 
U.N.T.S. 305, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/pdf/trtdocs_wo020.pdf.  
156 USJ FTA, supra note 146. 
157 Id. art. 4.3. 
158 Id. art. 4.24-4.25. 
159 Memorandum of Understanding on Issues Related to the Protection 
of Intellectual Property Rights Under the Agreement Between the United States 
and Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, Oct. 24, 2000 
[hereinafter IP MOU], http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreemen 
ts/fta/jordan/asset_upload_file120_8462.pdf. 
160 Id. (second emphasis added). 
 2013 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 2:1 
170 
contractual agreements, this agreement compels the Jordan 
government to protect IP rights.161 
Given Jordan’s secular implementation of Islamic law, it is 
not surprising to find significant protection for IP rights. The 
prevalence of Hanafi Scholars has likely contributed to Jordan’s 
secular approach, and there is little reason to expect any change in the 
near future considering the continued surge in Jordan’s economy. As 
will be discussed, the adoption of a similarly secular approach in 
post-revolution Egypt would likely benefit its economy and its 
citizens. 
B. IP Protection in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
Unlike Jordan, many commentators view Saudi Arabia as a 
fundamentalist government because of its substantial lack of progress 
with respect to human rights.162 According to the Saudi Basic Law, 
“The state protects human rights in accordance with the Islamic 
Shari’ah.”163 Consequently, one might expect the fundamentalist Saudi 
regime to be hesitant to implement IP protection. Nevertheless, 
Saudi Arabia has passed numerous IP statutes in the last decade.164 
Although Saudi Arabia has failed to progress significantly in the area 
                                                 
161 See discussion supra Part II.C. 
162 See, e.g., Saudi Arabia Human Rights, AMNESTY INT’L, http://www. 
amnestyusa.org/our-work/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/saudi-arabia?id 
=1011230 (last visited Oct. 30, 2012); BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, 
AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, JULY-DECEMBER, 2010 INTERNATIONAL 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT (Saudi Arabia) (Sept. 13, 2011) [hereinafter SA RF 
REPORT 2011], http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010_5/168275.htm. 
163 BASIC SYSTEM, Mar. 5, 1992, art. 26 (Saudi Arabia) [hereinafter SA 
BASIC LAW] (emphasis added), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id= 
7973. Because the Saudi Constitution is literally the Qur’an and Sunnah, the Saudi 
Basic Law acts as would a typical national constitution.  Id. art. 1. 
164 See Law of Trade Names, Umm al-Qura, 20 Nov. 1999 (Saudi Arabia); 
Law of Patents, Layout-Designs of Integrated Circuits, Plant Varieties, and 
Industrial Designs, Umm al-Qura, 16 July 2004 (Saudi Arabia); Copyright Law, Umm 
al-Qura, 30 Aug. 2003 (Saudi Arabia); Law of Trademarks, Umm al-Qura, 7 Aug 
2002 (Saudi Arabia) [hereinafter SA IP Laws].  Each of these laws can be found at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp?code=SA. 
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of human rights,165 the same is not true of its progress in international 
trade. 
Today, Saudi Arabia remains as one of only three Middle 
Eastern nations that uses Shari’ah as the sole basis for its legal 
system.166 Article 1 of the Saudi Basic Law states: “The Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia is a sovereign Arab Islamic state with Islam as its 
religion; God’s book and the Sunnah of His Prophet . . . are its 
constitution.”167 The Saudi Basic Law also states that the 
“[g]overnment in Saudi Arabia derives power from the Holy Qur’an 
and the Prophet’s tradition” and that the “Government . . . is based 
on the premise of justice, consultation, and equality in accordance 
with the Islamic Shari’ah.”168 These examples, among others,169 
demonstrate the emphasis on Islamic law found in Saudi Arabia’s 
Basic Law. Accordingly, Islamic law is paramount to lawmaking in 
Saudi Arabia. 
The Fiqh methodology employed by Hanbali scholars 
provides the basis for Saudi law.170 Hanbali scholars place little 
emphasis on Istislah (public interest), and they undertake Qiyas 
(reasoning by analogy) only as a last resort when guidance cannot be 
found through the literal words of the primary sources.171 As a result, 
Saudi lawmakers will most likely avoid significant use of Fiqh 
methodologies; instead, they will construct laws using the 
traditionalist view of Shari’ah interpretation.172 
                                                 
165 See, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 162; SA RF REPORT 2011, supra 
note 162. 
166 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 68. The other two nations that use 
Shari’ah law as the sole basis for their legal system are Sudan and Iran. Id. 
167 SA BASIC LAW, supra note 163, art. 1. 
168 Id. art. 7-8. 
169 For example, showing the government’s commitment to preserving 
Islamic ideals in its citizens, children “shall be brought up on the basis of the 
Islamic faith.” Id. art. 9; see also id. art. 14 (“[E]ducation will aim at instilling the 
Islamic faith in the younger generation.”). 
170 Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 72. 
171 See id. at 72-73. 
172 The traditionalist view of Shari’ah interpretation looks less to Fiqh 
interpretation methodologies and more to the literal language of the Qur’an and 
Sunnah for guidance.  See supra Part II.B.1. 
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Despite this traditionalist view, Saudi lawmakers have passed 
several laws protecting IP rights.173 These laws indicate their belief 
that IP rights are consistent with Shari’ah without significant 
interpretation through Fiqh. Saudi laws protect copyrights,174 
trademarks,175 trade names,176 patents,177 integrated circuits,178 
industrial designs,179 and plant varieties.180 Like Jordan, Saudi Arabia 
passed the majority of these laws shortly before joining the WTO in 
December 2005.181 Saudi Arabia’s willingness to adopt TRIPs, given 
its traditionalist reputation, indicates that Islamic law supports IP 
rights irrespective of the jurist’s method of Shari’ah interpretation. 
Notwithstanding Saudi Arabia’s traditionalist reputation and 
its lack of progress on human rights issues,182 lawmakers have 
provided substantial IP protection.183 Although Saudi Arabia may not 
agree with Jordan’s secular approach to Shari’ah,184 both nations 
agree that Islamic law should protect IP rights. 
                                                 
173 See SA IP Laws, supra note 164. 
174 Copyright Law, Umm al-Qura, 30 Aug. 2003 (Saudi Arabia), http:// 
www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=3593. 
175 Law of Trademarks, Umm al-Qura, 7 Aug 2002 (Saudi Arabia), http:// 
www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=3595. 
176 Law of Trade Names, Umm al-Qura, 20 Nov. 1999 (Saudi Arabia), http 
://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=7890. 
177 Law of Patents, Layout-Designs of Integrated Circuits, Plant Varieties, 
and Industrial Designs, Umm al-Qura, 16 July 2004 (Saudi Arabia), http://www. 
wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=3596. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 See Accession Status: Saudi Arabia, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www. 
wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_arabie_saoudite_e.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 
2012). 
182 See, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 162; SA RF REPORT 2011, supra 
note 162. 
183 See SA IP Laws, supra note 164. 
184 Compare Ferris K. Nesheiwat, Honor Crimes in Jordan: Their Treatment 
Under Islamic and Jordanian Criminal Law, 23 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 251 (2004) 
(discussing certain Jordan laws relating to human rights), with Frank E. Vogel, The 
Trial of Terrorists Under Classical Islamic Law, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53 (2002) 
(considering certain Saudi laws and human rights implications); see also Katherine 
M. Weaver, Women’s Rights and Shari’a Law: A Workable Reality? An Examination of 
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C. IP Protection in Pre-Revolution Egypt 
Since the Camp David accords and the peace treaty between 
Egypt and Israel in 1978,185 Egypt has shown stability in an otherwise 
volatile region.186 Moreover, Egypt has been a leader in the secular 
Islamic movement.187 As the “Arab world’s first secular 
dictatorship,”188 Egypt represented a significant shift toward tolerance 
and away from the traditionalist views many believe to be the primary 
source of Middle Eastern instability.189 For example, Egypt was one 
of the first Middle Eastern members of the WTO190 and has been a 
leading advocate for developing nations in the Doha Round of WTO 
negotiations.191 With the departure of President Mubarak, Egypt’s 
role as a stable leader in the Middle East is now uncertain. 
                                                 
Possible International Human Rights Approaches Through The Continuing Reform of the 
Pakistani Hudood Ordinance, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 483 (2007). 
185 In September 1978, U.S. President Jimmy Carter invited Israeli Prime 
Minister Begin and Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat to Camp David for secret 
negotiations. As a result, Egypt and Israel have remained at peace for the last three 
decades. See Camp David Accords, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www. 
britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/91061/Camp-David-Accords (last visited Oct. 
30, 2012). 
186 See Jane Friedman, Hosni Mubarak Brought Stability to Egypt, At a Price, 
VOICE OF AM., http://www.voanews.com/english/news/middle-east/Mubarak-
Egypts-Controversial-Former-Leader-115924004.html (last updated Feb. 11, 2011) 
(reflecting on the Mubarak presidency and the stability of the Egypt-Israel peace 
treaty over the last three decades). 
187 See Kirkpatrick, supra note 1; see also Jamar, supra note 84, at 1080 
(noting that Egypt’s IP laws have been adopted by many other Islamic nations). 
188 Kirkpatrick, supra note 1. 
189 See Mary Kate Cary, Democracy Must be the Future of the Middle East, US 
NEWS, Mar. 2, 2011, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2011/03/02/ 
democracy-must-be-the-future-of-the-middle-east (noting that “violent extremism” 
is a “source[] of tension in middle eastern nations”);  Terrorism, Concerns about 
Extremism & Foreign Policy, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 30, 2011), 
http://www.people-press.org/2011/08/30/section-6-terrorism-concerns-about-
extremism-foreign-policy/ (discussing concerns about violent extremism in the 
Muslim American community). 
190 See Egypt – Member Information, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www. 
wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/egypt_e.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
191 See Lynn, supra note 104 (noting that Egypt is “coordinator” of 
developing countries’ intellectual property group). 
 2013 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 2:1 
174 
Prior to the revolution, the Egyptian legal system combined 
Islamic law with a European style civil code.192 Like Jordan’s 
Constitution and Saudi Arabia’s Basic Law, the Egyptian 
Constitution193 established “Islam [as] the Religion of the State”194 
and declared “the principal source of legislation [to be] Islamic 
Jurisprudence.”195 Significantly, the Egyptian Constitution made “[a]ll 
citizens [] equal before the law”196 with respect to “sex, ethnic origin, 
language, religion or creed”197 and “guarantee[d] the freedom of belief 
and the freedom of practicing religious rights.”198 Such provisions are 
unusual for Islamic law constitutions199 and reflect the secularist 
governing approach adopted in Egypt. 
Shari’ah interpretation in Egypt derives primarily from Shafii 
scholars, although Hanafi and Maliki scholars have some influence.200 
Shafii scholars reject Istislah (public interest) and consider Qiyas 
(analogy) to be “the farthest legitimate extent” of Shari’ah 
interpretation permissible.201 However, the more moderate Hanafi 
and Maliki Schools permit consideration of Istislah, and Egypt’s 
legislative actions reflect this influence.202 
                                                 
192 Hossam A. El Saghir, Egypt, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
LAWS, 3 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Egypt-1, Egypt-16 (Roger Blanpain & 
Hendrick Vanhees eds., 2009). 
193 Note that, throughout this section, the Egyptian Constitution, 
statutes, international treaties, and other agreements created under the former 
Egyptian government will be referenced.  Although it will not be specified in each 
instance, any reference to governmental documents in this section should be 
understood as relating to the former Egyptian government, and not to the post-
revolution government. 
194 CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as 
amended, May 22, 1980, May 25, 2005, Mar. 26, 2007, art. 2 [hereinafter 
CONSTITUTION OF EGYPT], http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id= 
189854. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. art. 40. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. art. 46. 
199 See supra Parts III.A-B. 
200 See Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 70-73. 
201 Id. at 72. 
202 E.g., CONSTITUTION OF EGYPT, supra note 194, art. 2 (providing 
multiple clauses denoting considerations of public interest as well as considerations 
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Egypt began its IP protection scheme near the end of the 
1800s, earlier than most nations in the region.203 More recently, Egypt 
enacted a comprehensive IP statute that protects copyrights, 
trademarks, trade names, trade secrets, patents, integrated circuits, 
and plant varieties.204 It is significant that Egypt had IP laws in place 
before any international agreement so required.205 Egyptian 
lawmakers chose to protect IP independent of any contractual 
obligation, thereby showing that they “believed intellectual property 
to be compatible with Shari’ah.”206 
Furthermore, Egypt is among the first Islamic nations to have 
joined the WTO207 and has adopted several IP related international 
treaties.208  Egypt’s adherence to TRIPs is especially significant given 
that Egyptian scholars are willing to engage in Istislah (public 
interest).209 As discussed previously, the TRIPs agreement requires 
protecting pharmaceutical patents,210 and some scholars argue that 
this protection is harmful to the public interest.211 In effect, Egypt has 
                                                 
of the rights and privileges of the individual and public order and morality); Law 
No. 82 of 2002 (Law on the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights), Al-Jarida 
Al-Rasmiyya, 3 Jun. 2002 (Egypt), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_ 
id=126540 (noting the interests of public order and morality). 
203 Heba A. Raslan, Shari’a and the Protection of Intellectual Property – The 
Example of Egypt, 47 IDEA 497, 498 (2007). 
204 Law No. 82 of 2002 (Law on the Protection of Intellectual Property 
Rights), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya, 3 Jun. 2002 (Egypt), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/ 
en/text.jsp?file_id=126540.  The statute consists of four books.  Book one covers 
patents and integrated circuits; book two covers trademarks, trade names and trade 
secrets; book three covers copyrights; and book four covers plant varieties. 
205 Raslan, supra note 203, at 498. 
206 Chad M. Cullen, Can TRIPs Live in Harmony with Islamic Law? An 
Investigation of the Relationship Between Intellectual Property and Islamic Law, 14 SMU SCI. 
& TECH. L. REV. 45, 62 (2010). 
207 Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last updated Jul. 23, 2008). 
208 For a list of Egypt’s IP related multinational treaty agreements, see 
Egypt: IP Laws and Treaties, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/ 
wipolex/en/profile.jsp?code=EG (last updated July 2, 2012). 
209 Egyptian scholars are willing to engage in Istislah because of the 
influence of the Hanafi and Maliki Schools. See Abdal-Haqq, supra note 38, at 70-
73. 
210 See supra Part II.C. 
211 See supra Part II.C. 
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rejected this argument, and its role as a leading nation in the Middle 
East makes this rejection quite influential. 
In fact, Egypt had been a leading advocate on behalf of 
developing nations in the Doha Round of WTO negotiations,212 
where pharmaceutical patent protection is a principle concern.213  
Although Egypt disfavored pharmaceutical patent protection, 
lawmakers did not assert that such protection conflicted with Islamic 
law. Instead, Egypt enacted complying legislation and thereafter 
petitioned the WTO for a change in TRIPs requirements.214 In 
essence, Egypt asserted that the benefits of IP protection outweigh 
the harm that might result to public health.215 Through these actions, 
Egyptian lawmakers demonstrated their belief that Istislah does not 
forbid IP protection. 
Like the Islamic nations considered previously, Egypt has 
asserted harmonization of IP protection and Shari’ah through its legal 
and political actions. Finding neither convincing theoretical support 
against IP rights nor a real world example of an Islamic nation 
rejecting them, Islamic law appears to support IP protection. 
IV. THE FUTURE OF EGYPT 
With new government comes change. Indeed, change is 
precisely what Egyptian citizens want, and rightly so.216 However, not 
all change is for the better. This section discusses the potential 
changes coming to Egypt through a new democratically elected 
                                                 
212 Lynn, supra note 104. 
213 See The Doha Round, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/eng 
lish/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm#development (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
214 See Lynn, supra note 104. 
215 See discussion supra Part II.C. 
216 The Mubarak regime’s human rights violations against the Egyptian 
people are well documented.  See Emily Loftis, Mubarak’s Human Rights Legacy, 
MOTHER JONES (Feb. 1, 2011, 7:00 AM), http://motherjones.com/mojo/2011/ 
01/mubaraks-human-rights-record (commenting on accusations of torture, police 
violence, and other human rights violations in Egypt); see also Egypt: Impunity for 
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news/2011/01/31/egypt-impunity-torture-fuels-days-rage (asserting that human 
rights violations by the Mubarak administration fueled the revolution). 
 2013 Comment 2:1 
177 
government and how different applications of Islamic law might 
affect Egyptian IP protection and international trade relations. 
The traditional argument against IP rights begins by asserting 
that “the concept of ownership in Shari’a is confined to tangible 
objects only.”217 This assertion is based on the idea that, because the 
primary sources (Qur’an and Sunnah) do not mention intangible 
property, Shari’ah does not support its recognition.218 Such a 
construction essentially rejects Fiqh interpretation methodologies 
entirely.219 Even the most traditionalist Shari’ah scholars rarely accept 
this extreme position.220 
In the past, Egyptian lawmakers have demonstrated a 
willingness to engage in Fiqh primarily under the Shafii School of 
interpretation, with some influence from the Hanafi and Maliki 
Schools.221 Because the same scholars continue to predominate in 
Egypt, there is no reason to expect any shift in the theology of 
Egyptian lawmakers causing the rejection of IP rights. 
Although Shafii scholars are more traditional in their 
application of Fiqh reasoning, they have always accepted Qiyas 
(reasoning by analogy) as a legitimate interpretation method.222 There 
is a clear analogy to be drawn between tangible and intangible 
property, especially because the Qur’an justifies property 
accumulation through individual undertaking.223 Like tangible 
property, IP arises from such undertakings, making IP rights equally 
justified. 
                                                 
217 Raslan, supra note 203, at 502 (quoting Mufti Taki Usmani, Copyright 
According to Shariah, ALBALAGH, http://www.albalagh.net/qa/copyright.shtml (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2012)). 
218 See supra Part II.C. 
219 See supra Part II.C. 
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methodologies of Ijma (consensus) and Qiyas (analogy).  Abdal-Haqq, supra note 
38, at 73. 
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A second argument against IP rights arises from the Shari’ah 
prohibition of gains disproportionate (and therefore dishonest) to the 
property holder’s efforts.224 Some scholars argue that although IP 
rights arise from personal efforts, they provide disproportionate 
wealth to undeserving persons.225 
This argument ties in with another similar argument against 
IP rights: Shari’ah prohibits usury, or interest.226 Some Islamic 
scholars view interest as unwarranted financial gain and argue that it 
is therefore prohibited.227 These prohibitions derive from the main 
justification of property under Islamic law—that individuals should 
accumulate in wealth and property an amount proportionate to their 
efforts.228 
Some traditionalist scholars therefore argue that Islamic law 
prohibits IP protection because the owners of IP rights often receive 
royalties far greater than their investment.229 Additionally, these 
scholars argue that licensing fees are comparable to interest, and 
represent an unjustified markup, or usury.230 
While such arguments may have found support in historical 
Islamic interpretation, they have proved far less useful in modern 
Islamic society.231 An absolute ban on interest would render banking 
                                                 
224 Qur’an 104:1-2 (“Woe to every (kind of) scandal-monger and 
backbiter, who pileth up wealth and layeth it by.”). 
225 See Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 75; Amir H. Khoury, Ancient and 
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43 IDEA 151, 167 (2003). 
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227 See Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 75-76; Khoury, supra note 225, at 190-
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229 See Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 75-76; Khoury, supra note 225, at 189. 
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231 See Beltrametti, supra note 41, at 86; see also Khoury, supra note 225, at 
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impracticable, and, as such, the Shari’ah prohibition of usury is 
normally limited to excessive interest.232 Furthermore, the 
disproportionate gains argument represents a subjective 
determination, and rejecting IP rights entirely on such a basis is 
improbable at best. A more likely solution would be statutory 
limitations on royalties. 
Today, neither moderate nor traditionalist Shari’ah scholars 
find much support for the outright rejection of IP rights.233 The 
realities of modern society encourage IP protection.234 The number 
of Islamic nations who have enacted IP protection legislation reflects 
this reality.235 There is little room remaining in modern Islamic 
society for the type of literal interpretation that would preclude IP 
rights under Shari’ah. 
Whatever the political nature of the new Egyptian 
government, lawmakers will most likely continue to protect IP rights.  
Egypt has historically been among the leaders in the secular Islamic 
movement,236 which indicates the progressive mindset of many 
Egyptian citizens. With a populace that supports continued 
advancement in the global marketplace, an Islamic traditionalist 
government rejecting IP rights would be incompatible. 
Moreover, Egypt will continue to protect IP rights because it 
must adhere to the international agreements of the previous 
government. Islamic law commands practitioners to fulfill their 
contractual obligations.237 Even if the new Egyptian government 
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considered disregarding the obligations of its predecessor regime, 
Islamic law compels it otherwise.238 International scholars and 
businesspersons can therefore rest assured that Egyptian IP 
protection will persevere. 
Egypt’s future as a stable, secular leader in the Middle East 
may be in doubt,239 but the revolution’s effect on IP rights and 
protections should be minimal. The Egyptian people seek progress in 
human rights and quality of life, and IP rights provide a vehicle for 
that progress. 
CONCLUSION 
Historically, IP rights have contributed substantially to 
economic advancement.240 The United States—the world’s 
predominant economic power241 —has enjoyed the benefits of IP 
protection since ratifying its Constitution in 1787.242 After 
implementing similar policies, other nations have experienced similar 
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economic gains.243 The impact of innovation on economic prosperity 
is undisputable, and IP protection encourages this innovation. 
The same economic interests inspire Islamic nations like 
Egypt to protect IP rights. Shari’ah principles have progressed over 
time, and few Islamic scholars now advocate against IP rights. 
Perhaps the words of Steven D. Jamar244 reflect this progression best: 
Regardless of whether Islamic law moves in the 
direction of modern reformist theoreticians or toward 
more fundamentalist traditionalists, there is no 
compelling reason to anticipate dramatic 
enhancement or reduction in the protections of 
intellectual property based solely on the desire to 
make them fit within the shari’a. Other political 
concerns may result in sweeping changes or a 
particular zealot’s view of the proper interpretation of 
the Quran and the shari’a could result in dramatic 
changes, but such changes are not compelled by 
either traditional or modern understanding of the 
shari’a.245 
Without a prohibition on IP rights arising from Islam, Egypt 
can continue IP protection and ride its revolution to economic 
prosperity and social equality, a vision that the Egyptian people yearn 
to experience. 
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